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Abstract. Nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the near past have all faced the same 
dilemma: how can they manage international encouragement to adopt atlantic patterns in 
promise of ready-made routes with immediate success, in a way also promoting the paths of 
organic development, relying on own resources and potentialities that can only be gained from 
tradition? Or, otherwise speaking, is it feasible at all to rush forward by rapidly learning all the 
responses others elaborated elsewhere at a past time? Or are they expected themselves to 
become Sisyphus bearing his own way, at the price of suffering and bitter disillusionment? The 
question was not raised by each country individually in the region as not much time was left 
for pondering in the rapid drift of events. Anyhow, cost-free solutions adopted from without 
may easily lead to adverse results, far away from expectations for the time being. The 
principles of free market, democracy and parliamentarism–with rule of law and human rights 
in the background–are usually believed to offer a kind of panacea curing the basic ills in the 
contemporary world. Generalised experience notwithstanding, social science has to be given 
the chance to record–if found so–that the same staff may not work at some places where it has 
just recently been transplanted as it is used to work amidst its natural surrounding in the 
western hemisphera, not with the same cost/benefit ratio at the least. For that reason, 
scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe is growingly aware of the fact that what it can 
provide is by far not marginal feedback but the very first testing and teasing proof on social 
embeddedness of some ideas and ideals, deservedly fundamental for the atlantic world. 
Realistically speaking, not even western social development is separable from the economic 
reserves of the development actually run. Or, operation of any societal complexity requires 
resources in both social organisation and material production.   
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Having recovered from the trauma of surviving Soviet imperial socialism 
and compelled to open up new ways in independent state-building in parallel 
with the readjustment of what is left as local legal arrangement to common 
European standards, nations of Central and Eastern Europe all have faced the 
  
 * Scientific Adviser, Institute for Legal Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-
1250 Budapest, P. O. Box 25; Professor, Director of the Institute for Legal Philosophy of the 
Pázmány Péter Catholic University of Hungary, H–1428 Budapest 8, P. O. Box 6. 
E-mail: varga@jak.ppke.hu 
2 CSABA VARGA 
  
same dilemma: how can they manage international encouragement to adopt 
foreign patterns in promise of ready-made routes with immediate success, in a 
way also promoting the paths of organic development, relying on own resources 
and potentialities that can only be gained from tradition? Is it feasible at all to 
rush forward by rapidly learning all the responses others elaborated elsewhere 
at a past time? Or are they expected themselves to become Sisyphus bearing 
his own way, at the price of suffering and bitter disillusionment? The question 
was not raised by each country individually as not much time was left for 
pondering in the rapid drift of events. Anyhow, cost-free solutions adopted from 
without may easily lead to adverse results far away from expectations. By 
the time of awakening, however, posterior wisdom may show that there is an 
alternative always available, even if its practicability is not clear to those 
affected at the urgently given moment. 
 One and a half decades after the collapse of the Soviet empire we fully realise 
now how painful the fact is that each country embarking on dramatic changes 
was completely left in isolation to face its national renewal programme, drifted 
by accidental circumstances. Neither the consciousness nor the organisational 
framework of the mutual dependence of those concerned was strong enough, 
and Moscow as the focus was this time substituted by another centre of power, 
even less interested in the target countries which were just awakening either in 
self-esteem or as a potential counterpole.1 In consequence, each country had to 
embark upon separate efforts at reform, channelled by so-called open society 
agencies;2 however, as we all know, improvisation is not likely to outcome 
products worth of consolidation. 
 The early and total failure of the Hungarian efforts at coming to terms with 
the past3 was only one among a few shocking episodes. This alone might have 
made us realise that we should not have attempted to respond to a considerably 
universal challenge just on our own, and perhaps a genuine transnational co-
  
 1 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Amerikai önbizalom, orosz katasztrófa: Kudarcot vallott keresztes-
hadjárat? [American self-confidence, Russian catastrophe: failed crusade?]. PoLísz, 2002–
2003, No. 68, 18–28. 
 2 See e.g. Cohen, St.: Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-communist 
Russia. New York, 2000 and–as a by-admission–Holmes, St.: Transitology. London Review 
of Books, vol. 23. 2001/8. 32–35. 
 3 Cf. e.g. from Varga, Cs.: Transition to Rule of Law: On the Democratic Transfor-
mation in Hungary. Budapest, 1995. Part on Coming to Terms with the Past, 119–155. 
[Philosophiae Iuris.] and Coming to Terms with the Past under the Rule of Law: The German 
Model. Budapest, 1994. [Windsor Klub.] as well as A »gyökeresen gonosz« a jog mérlegén 
[»Radical evil« on trial]. Magyar Jog, vol. 49. 2002/6. 332–337. 
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operation might have evolved, had not been our initiative in Hungary too early, 
even pioneering. 
 
* 
 
A Lithuanian theoretical response4 will be overviewed in the following. It is 
certainly not the earliest one as its the author may have learned from the 
experience of others.5 Yet it is remarkably rational and systematic. For he 
reconsiders ancient wisdoms in the light of our days’ ideals, and draws historical 
lessons from his Lithuanian case study by responding to the shared failures of 
our global new world. 
 The ideal of rule of law–formulated also in the preamble of the Constitution 
of Lithuania (1992) after she has returned to the path of independent state-
building by 19906–indicates a recognition according to which the unlimitedness 
of observing any law in a Rechtsstaat can be restricted by the value-centredness of 
a rule of law, which value shall be fully implemented by the principle of inter-
vention of a Sozialrechtsstaat when care for “strengthening those socially weak 
  
 4 Vaišvila, A.: Teisinės valstybės koncepcija lietuvoje [The Lithuanian approach to 
rule of law]. Vilnius, 2000. [with abstracts: Law-governed State and its Problems of the 
Formation in Lithuania: The Outline of State Ideology. 611–631. and Правовое государство 
и проблеми его становления в Литве: Поиски государственной идеологии. 632–635.]. 
Cf. also from Vaišvila, A.: Conception of the State Ruled by Law in Lithuania. (Summary of the 
Research Report Presented for Habilitation.) Vilnius, 2001. [The Law University of Lithuania.] 
as well as–in multiplication–Rechtspersonalismus (Zusammenfassung)., Die Rechtsaxiomatik 
oder das Modell der vier Axiome als inhaltliche Grundlage des Rechtspersonalismus., Die 
geometrische Formel des Rechtes als des mehrstelligen Prädikats. and Das Recht als Prozess 
(als das Werden). Chairholder for legal philosophy at the Faculty of Jurisprudence of the Law 
University of Vilnius, Professor Alfonsas Vaišvila has authored a number of books covering 
ranges of topics spanning from Lithuanian history of ideas (including philosophy and logic) 
via social compromise, liberalism, tolerance, democracy and state of law to statism as well as 
crime control. 
 5 As a summary of the debates in Poland, see Wronkowska, Sł. (red.) Polskie dyskusje o 
państwie prawa: Zarys koncepcji państwa prawnego w polskiej literaturze politicznej i 
prawnej [Polish discussions on the state of law: summary of the concepts of the state of law 
in the Polish political and legal literature]. Warszawa, 1995. Also cf. Varga, Cs. (ed.) Kiáltás 
gyakorlatiasságért a jogállami átmenetben [A call for practicality in the transition to rule of 
law]. Budapest, 1998. [A Windsor Klub könyvei II.] 
 6 “The Lithuanian nation strives for an open, just and harmonious civil society and a 
state ruled by law.” The expression ‘state of law’ was first used in Lithuanian literature by 
M. Cimkauskas (1922) and described historically and systemically by M. Römeris–Teisinės 
valstybės organizacija. In: Lietuvos universitetas: 1927–1928 mokslo metais. Kaunas, 1928. 
6–31.–, followed by contemporaries as P. Leonas and others. 
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and weakening the strong”7 is at stake. Looking back in history, Lithuanians 
may now realise that their ancestors in the 16th to 17th centuries8 had already 
separated–in their search for a “well-organised” and “organic” state–law [ius] 
from the laws [lex] and demanded law to be right (by serving everyone’s good 
with sound reason), moreover, that the presumed original freedom which may 
have led to their first integrative social contract could not entitle to anarchy but 
only prepare for balancing. The Lithuanian Statutes (1529, 1566 and 1588) 
ensured an extremely all-covering rule of law for the nobility. This was even 
further restricted by the Polish liberum veto.9 After all, the disintegration of the 
ruler’s power and responsibility could only result in either the tyranny of nobles 
(as beneficiaries) against everyone or the coming of foreigners to rule (free of 
any limitation whatsoever) with at least some promise of order. Well, as known 
from history, both alternatives did subsequently materialise in Lithuania. 
 Reconsideration is imperative for all concerned, only if in order to avoid 
the traps of the past. One has to be careful to escape the temptation of any kind 
of dogmatism–foremost that of absolutising universalisation–, even if some of 
the issues now crop up in global proportions, as a consequence of the new role 
assumed by the American foreign policy after the cold war and the Soviet 
might are over. The early 20th-century Lithuanian classic of public law already 
emphasised that the rule of law is hardly more than a specifically disciplined 
ethos, only conceivable as the direction of a constantly renewing ambition: it 
never arrives at completion for “it cannot be answered once and for all”.10 Or, 
it is not even an external pattern to be simply followed and implemented, for it 
is not of the kind to presume the mechanically “obedient execution or imitation” 
of requirements once stipulated by others.11 This is all the more remarkable 
now when the course of globalisation, maximising the rule by rule of law and 
human rights with a growing disregard to other considerations and values, is 
about to tumble on disintegrating contradictions and dysfunctions. While 
eliminating certain threats to human rights, the state ruled by law–writes the 
author–originates new ones immediately, which are inherent in the notion of 
human rights itself,12 that is, in their abstract conceptualisation, totally insensitive 
  
  7 Stein, E. Staatsrecht. 14., völlig neu bearb. Auflage. Tübingen, 1993. 
  8 E.g. J. Chondzinskis, A. Goštautas, M. Lietuvis, P. Roizijus, A. Rotundas, L. Sapiega, 
P. Skarga, A. Volanas. 
  9 Cf. Konopczyński, L.: Le liberum veto: Étude sur le développement du principe 
majoritaire. Paris et Varsovie, 1930. [Institut d’Études slaves de l’Université de Paris: 
Bibliothèque polonaise II.]. 
 10 Römeris: op. cit. 6. 
 11 Vaišvila: op. cit. (2001), 11. 
 12 Ibid. 6. 
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to their own social (pre)conditions, ways of operation and consequences in the 
short as well as the long run. 
 The author inquires into the conditions of reaching states of genuine 
balance upon the basis of reciprocity between law and social solidarity, on the 
one hand, as well as between (with regards to the openness of social order) full 
social consent and (with regards to the openness of law and order) the inseparable 
unity of rights and duties, on the other. He reminds that just as the downfall 
of the first (1572–1795) and the second (1918–1926) republic of Lithuania was 
due to the over-limitation of the sovereign, exposing the country to external 
despotism, what happens today is the liberalisation of anti-sociality through 
the restriction of the executive power with reference to abstract human rights.13 
 Preliminary to raising any issue relating to the rule of law is the assessment 
of the state of actual social conditions. For the author, the acknowledgement of 
the priority of human person with inborn rights, taken as the source of his 
autonomy, as well as overwhelming social co-operation based on contracts and 
mutual concessions and the social majority’s active and organised participation 
are of utmost importance. In contrast, what reality shows now is rather legal 
statism and exclusivity of the dominance of formal law. Even rule of law is 
mostly conceived of as formal institutionalisation, mere dictate of the law [lex]. 
However, until the Lithuanian Constitution (§ 109, Section 3) provides for the 
judges to proceed “exclusively according to the laws”–instead of laws “and law 
[ius]” as he claims–, no genuine division of powers can be achieved. 
 Functionally, law is based upon the unity of subjective rights and legal 
duties. Rights cannot be but relative, otherwise they degenerate into aggressive 
privileges. This mutual dependence arises as part of the natural order from the 
natural state of humankind, open to exchange equivalent services. Such an 
interconnection is not made by the state. All that the state can do is to make 
statements about. Law [ius] in a democratic society can therefore only be built 
on a legal conception not reduced to mere laws [lex]. In a democratic society 
only such claims can be posited as law that are in compliance with human 
rights, express social agreement and formulate as legal imperatives only 
provisions whose realisation is also guaranteed by the state’s instruments (i.e., 
to the extent of the state’s economic capacity and approval by citizens) (ch. 4). 
 Or, the state is not in a position to met out justice or punish, moreover, it is 
not even the state to deprive anyone of his/her freedom, At the most, all a state 
does is to officially establish the new status of the rights of a person when it 
gets diminished by his/her own action of rejecting the fulfilment of certain 
duties. Consequently, neither capital punishment, nor its possible abolishment 
  
 13 Ibid. 12. 
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is within the state’s but exclusively within the perpetrator’s discretion. Anyone 
who kills, by negating the right to life of others, deprives himself of his right to 
his own life. The act of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court–argues the author–, 
having decided for the abolishment on December 9, 1998, declaring § 105 of 
the Lithuanian Criminal Code to be unconstitutional, can only be construed in 
that it either denied its citizens their natural right to equality in reciprocity or 
pardoned for the future in general terms on a non-legal basis (unauthorised by 
citizens, yet normatively). Moreover, not even the failure of regulation can 
result in breaking up the necessary balance between rights and duties or in 
impunishment, because otherwise criminal aggression would be encouraged. 
Therefore the formal, exhaustive and exclusive statutory definition of crimes 
needs to be complemented by the availability of judicial–casual–correction.14 
Entering the 21st century, the author perceives that the absolute prohibition of 
analogy in criminal law may have fairly been motivated by past experience of 
totalitarianism, on the one hand. On the other, he generalises from the data of 
20th-century international criminal practice, Anglo–American jurisprudence 
and continental penalising trends that the actual boundaries of today’s formally 
absolute prohibition are becoming increasingly flexible under contemporary 
well-balanced rule of law conditions (ch. 5).15 
 According to his vision, the prevalence of capital concentration with the split 
of society to the rich and the poor has been generating a sui generis type of 
authoritarianism-cum-totalitarianism under the guise of total liberalism. Situations 
come about by threatening effects in terms of which enlarging groups of 
addressees will have to practically resign of their rights and legal rights-
protection on the command of biological survival. The present degree of actual 
poverty and defencelessness in Lithuania is already about to genuinely erode the 
predisposition of the state. The shameful fact that only 40 to 42 per cent of the 
officially known criminal acts are actually prosecuted against can only mean that 
the other 60 to 58 per cent of national sovereignty on the field of crime control is 
lost. However, this other part must not benefit the criminals–as is the case today–
but the victims, either by providing them efficient protection or by giving them 
back the right to protect themselves against crime at least to a viable extent. It is 
  
 14 For case-law can only counterbalance the fact actualised by a specific case that 
legislation cannot be exhaustive, by ensuring the universality of implementation of the 
basic principles of criminal law. Ibid. 23. 
 15 Arnold, J.: Prinzipien und Grundsätze im deutschen Strafrecht und im Entwurf des 
Allgemeinen Teils des Litauischen Strafgesetzbuches. Jurisprudencija [Vilnius], vol. 9. 
1998/1. 62–74., in particular–using the expression ‘fließend’ when surveying the German 
practice of Analogieverbot–on 68. 
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little wonder if in situations like this, citizens’ traditional confidence in the state 
is withdrawn, only to be replaced, instead, either in their own hands or in powers 
beyond this world. In 1996, only 25 per cent of the Lithuanian population 
claimed they trusted their own Parliament yet 74 per cent claimed they trusted 
the Catholic Church. After many decades of Soviet occupation, it is tragic to 
recall that there was a time when power in Lithuania was seized by foreigners 
with promise of order they provided against the tyranny of Lithuanian nobles. 
Anyway, Lithuanian officials ascertain that their justice system is hardly 
sufficiently operable today. A criminal environment can be effective enough to 
deter injured parties and witnesses from taking part in the administration of 
justice. Law is not a protective power any more. Legal proceeding may have lost 
any sense. Criminals have in fact extended their control over law and order, 
practically depriving society of the chance of legal protection, degrading citizens 
to growingly becoming partners themselves to the very aggression criminals are 
used to commit against them. It is the aggression by criminal asociality that gets 
eventually supported by the abstract protection of human rights. 
 Is it possible that after a totalitarian past, democracy will only arrive later 
on, when the present mixture of liberalism-cum-authoritarianism will have been 
left behind? Is there any logic of history in that the former lack of freedom is 
now compensated by immoderate, even asocial libertinism?16 What are the 
symptomatic indicators here? According to the author, the weakness of a 
middle-class in substantiation of democracy, the miserable state of economy, 
the lack of chance for any genuine civil initiative, the feeble self-assertivity of 
the populace (e.g., when all personal bank-savings of Soviet times were frozen 
by the Parliament once and for all on July 19, 1995, by a posterior unilateral 
statutory modification of the conditions of fulfilment of contractual obligations 
laid down in § 471 of the Lithuanian Civil Code), the want of high state officials’ 
respect for the law (e.g., when the president of the republic or the Seym may 
fail to observe their formal duties without any legal consequences, or the state 
elite defines ad hoc measures when own remuneration is at stake), as well as 
the undisturbed misappropriation of public property (through commercial 
banks and companies with a state share) are among the first to be considered. 
 Rule of law is hardly imaginable without proper social and psychological, 
ideological and constitutional foundations. As to the current political experience 
in Lithuania, it calls for a stronger presidency as well as for a parliament with 
more effectivity in balancing. For what the constitutionalist Römeris wrote about 
parliamentocracy as a mere theoretical potentiality three quarters of a century 
ago had by now become everyday reality, until the last election in October 2000 
  
 16 For the term, cf. Meyer, F. S.: Libertarianism and Libertinism? National Review, 1969. 
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brake the continuation of communists’ domination. In fact, pursuant to § 72, 
Sections 2–3, of the Constitution, any bill can be–even repeatedly and without 
the slightest alteration–passed by absolute majority, despite any veto of the 
president of the state. So, nine protests by president Brazauskas could be consti-
tutionally ignored in 1997 without paying the least attention to his motifs. As 
to historical antecedents, § 51 Section 2 of their Constitution of 1928 followed 
the American model by providing for a qualified two-third majority in case a bill 
had been vetoed against. As fairly recalled, president Roosevelt interposed official 
veto 631 times until the New Deal could be implemented, moreover, Lithuania 
herself was in favour of a strong presidency both in far-away and recent past.17 
The population still trusts significantly more even a weak president than a 
Parliament formed by random circumstances and, as the case may be, some-
times tragically exposed to the play of mere chance. This is clearly indicated 
by the contrasted support through varying periods and circumstances notwith-
standing: 
 
 
president Algirdas Brazauskas Parliament 
December 1993  60,0 % 34,0 % 
June 1996 20,0 % 14,0 % 
president Valdas Adamkus Parliament 
June 1998 71,2 % 12,7 % 
December 1998  76,4 % 13,4 % 
 
Thus, there is a contradiction that can barely be eliminated by means of mere 
rhetoric: while the country is actually ruled by a power of a rather low esteem, 
  
 17 De-stabilisation efforts were also made in 1922, at the dawn of the young republic, 
under the pretext of stabilising the legal status of Parliament. 
 The partisan movement Žalioji rinktinė, continuing the fight against the Soviet occupy-
ing powers in Eastern Lithuania, declared in 1945: “We want a presidential republic, 
similar to the one of the United States of America, with a powerful president.” [V. Kuročkos 
apklausos protokolas (archive manuscript). 15.]–The World Congress of Lithuanian Lawyers 
declared on May 24–31, 1992: “Exclusively a strong presidency can ensure the stability of 
social processes, block the way to chaos and neutralise the destructivity of those thirsting for 
revenge, in order to become the buttress of the further development of democracy.” [Kaganas, 
I.: Lietuvos Respublikos valdymo forma–Lietuvos valstybingumo teisinės problemos: Pirmojo 
pasaulio leituvių teisininkų kongreso straipsnių ir tezių rinkinys. Vilnius, 1993. 7.]–It was 
President Algirdas Brazauskas who took a stand when his vetos were ignored, in that “To be 
able to operate efficiently, the President should also be given more power, following the 
introduction of the democratic pattern of governance.” [Lietuvos rytas, 1997. February 14.] 
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the power preponderably trusted by the nation is without almost any sensible 
competence (ch. 8, para 2).18 
 Or, the exclusive way to, standard and criterion of a “well-organised” and 
“organic” state now are on the final analysis nothing but the “maintenance of 
comprehensive balance” in each field of the entire social, political and legal set-
up as the exclusively available guarantee of political stability, social equality 
and legal reciprocity.19 
 This is the reason why the author developed his theory of so-called legal 
personalism, based on the axiomatics of the geometrical formula of law taken 
as a compound predicate. I avail just to mention some of its fundamental tenets. 
Accordingly, the equivalence in reciprocity of social relations is the pre-requisite 
of any open society. It follows therefrom that “subjective right is not the property 
of the individual but, as a compound predicate, is a relation established for the 
mutual protection of the interests of all persons concerned.” Consequently, on 
the ground of the reciprocity having come about with the “unity of rights and 
duties”, the individual is, depending upon his/her deeds, always in balance with 
his/her own respective rights and duties, because “by fulfilling or rejecting 
the latter, he has the former recognised, legalised or annihilated” automatically. 
And, indeed, there is no other way, for “Rights without obligations are nothing 
but downright privileges, while duties without rights can only stand for sheer 
violence.”20 
* 
  
 18 Vaišvila: op. cit. (2001), 32–36. 
 19 Also see from Vaišvila: Meсто наказания в правовом государстве [Mesto naka-
zaniia v pravovom gossudarstve; The place of punishment in a state of law]. In: Проблеми 
вдосконаления законодавства та практика його застосувания з урахуванням прогнозу 
злочинности [Problemi vdoskonaleniia zakonodavstva ta praktika iogo zastoczvaniia z 
urakhuvanniam prognozu zlotsinnosti]. 1. Луганськ [Lugansk], 1999. 44–49. [Вісник 
Луганського інституту внутрішніх справ МВС Украіни.] and Социальное правовое 
государство: Приобретамая и теряемая реальность [Sotsialnoe pravovoe gossudarstvo: 
Priobretamaia i teriaemaia realnost’; The social state of law]. In: Конституционно-
правовое проблемы формирования социального правового государства: Материалы 
международной конференции [Konstitutsionno-pravovoe problemi formirovaniia sotsial’nogo 
pravovogo gossudarstva: Materiali mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii]. Минск [Minsk], 2000. 24–28. 
 20 “Die Äquivalenz der Austausche […ist…] die Einheit von Rechten (der Erlaubnis) und 
Pflichten (dem Gebot) zu bestimmen […:…] die Menschenrechte werden nach der Erfüllung 
oder der Verzicht der entsprechenden Pflichten erworben, legalisiert oder verloren.” “Das 
subjektive Recht ist nicht die Eigenschaft des Individuums, es ist ein mehrstelliges Prädikat 
bzw. das Verhältnis, das für den gegenseitigen Schutz der Interessen der Personen geschaffen 
ist.” “Das Recht ohne Pflicht gleicht einen Privilegien, die Pflicht ohne Recht ist bloße 
Gewalt.” 
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The oeuvre herewith presented is not a cry for help but the manifestation of a 
responsible scholarship gradually realising its own strength and independence. 
It is rewarding to learn that the same ethos that, after the Soviet regime is 
bygone, can introduce Western trends as desirable patterns to be followed with 
natural ease, also indicates the need for new foundations, by building up–
having left behind its earlier forms rooted in Bolshevik ideology–own world-
view consequently. This is exactly what the oeuvre just surveyed did. Having 
overviewed the mostly pattern-following and more or less promising or dis-
appointing results of Lithuanian domestic development spanning over nearly 
one and a half decades as givens of their history, it assessed them monographically. 
His very approach presumed sound scepticism as pre-requisite to any responsibly 
constructive thought, subjecting any result to scrutiny, omitting reliance on either 
clearly personal [ad hominem] or exclusively authoritarian [ad autoritatem] 
reasons in their evaluation. 
 It would be a shock if the arrogance of force could define again itself in the 
guise of the renewed ideology of “So much the worse for the facts”–this time 
at the overture to the 21st century. It is a fact notwithstanding that ideas and 
constructions that stream towards us from overseas are expected to get rooted in 
a soil poor in resources, targeting a disintegrated society with distorted morals, 
in which only reliance to individual surviving strategies proves to be exclusively 
adequate a personal response amidst an economy fallen prey to the stronger and 
professionally only preoccupied with the exhaustion of national property. 
 According to the creed of many, the principles of free market, democracy 
and parliamentarism (with rule of law and human rights in the background) 
offer a kind of panacea curing all the ills in the world. Still, social science 
should be given the chance to record–if found so–that the same staff may not 
work here as it is used to work there amidst its natural surrounding; not with 
the same cost/benefit ratio at the least. Social science is open for ideas to both 
receive in test and reject upon criticism. Moreover, scholarship in Central and 
Eastern Europe is growingly aware of the fact that what it can provide is by far 
not marginal feedback but the very first testing and teasing proof on social 
embeddedness of ideas and ideals exported. For whatever we think of the 
cultural anthropological preconditions of such guiding stars of modernity and 
of the scientific verifiability of the concept of man they postulate,21 Western 
  
 21 If the presuppositions of democracy are not provable, only tradition axiomatically 
taken from the credo of Enlightenment can be the case. Cf. Frivaldszky, J.: Gondolatok az 
emberi jogok radikális szemléletéből fakadó problémákról [Thoughts on problems arising 
from the radical approach to human rights]. In: Frivaldszky, J. (ed.) Egy európai alkotmány 
felé: A nizzai Alapvető Jogok Chartája és a Konvent [Towards a European constitution: the 
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social development (with the ideocracy of Dworkin, Habermas and Rawls, in 
terms of which values are just a random function of supporting majority and 
rights are made one of the gratuitous accessories of any human existence) is by no 
means separable from the economic reserves of such a development. Or, opera-
tion of any societal complexity requires resources in both social organisation and 
material production. In the Atlantic world, presently they seem they are available 
either through economic reproduction or by using up reserves. Consequently, 
if it proves to be too wasteful or costly, less powerful regions of the world 
may encounter problems of financing, for they are in want of reserves. 
 Scholarly sensitivity to issues like this has developed in the western world 
as well,22 even if not yet transcending local self-analysis. Until now, scholars 
have failed to address either other regions or their ideals’ very preconditions. 
This is why the issues raised above are still questions–on and for us. This is 
why they shall have to be tackled at least by those concerned. 
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 22 Cf. e.g. Holmes, St. & Sunstein, C. R.: The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Defends on 
Taxes. New York, 1999. as well as, by Posner, R. A.: The Economics of Justice. Cambridge 
(Mass.), 1983. and Economic Analysis of Law. New York, 1998. As an outlook, see also 
Sajó, A. (ed.) Western Rights? Post-communist Application. The Hague, 1996. 
